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The World Wide Web(WWW) makes using the Intemet easy and efficient. Information
providers can provide hypeltext links,fill-in-forms, clickable images, and even
executable programs through it [10]. Users can enjoy various forms of those services.
They can also make their home page, similar to information providers. In addition to it,
more people wanted to make interactive home pages to make their pages alive.
To develop interactive home pages, one needs to understand the Client-Server
interaction [2] between the WWW clients (commonly known as browsers sllch as
Mosaic, Netscape and Internet Explorer) and an Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
server called HTTPD [10]. This interaction involves two distinct but closely related
issues. The first issue is the HTTP protocol used for communication with HTTP servers.
This protocol has several specific communication methods (for example, GET or POST)
that allow clients to request data from the server and send information to the server riO].
The second issue is the way HTTP servers handle a client's requests. If the request is for
a file, the server simply locates the file and sends it, or sends an appropriate error message
if the file is not available. Of interest here is the situation when the client wants to send
information to the server for more complicated processing. In general, Web servers do
not perform this processing themselves. The work is delegated to other programs called
gateway programs. The Common Gateway Interface (CGl) specification defines the
mechanism by which HTTP servers commwlicate with gateway programs [1].
CGI is a method for running programs on the Web server based on input :5:om a Web
browser. Gateway programs can be referenced by Universal Resource Locators (URLs)
[3,11,12]. For example, GET is used to get a file or other resource, possibly with
parameters specifying more exactly what is needed. In the case of form input, GET fully
includes it in the URL, like
http://www.cs.okstate.eduJ-choim/myscript.cgi?name1 =value1&name2=value2
When a client accesses a URL pointing to a gateway program such as a script or
executable code, the server activates the program and uses the COl mechanisms to pas to
the program data sent by the client (if any). The gateway program processes the data and
sends its response back to the HTTP server, again using the CGl mechanisms. The server
then forwards the data to the client such as Netscape and Mosaic that initiated the request
using the HTTP protocol, completing the transaction. Figure 1 illustrates the COl
transaction in the context of World Wide Web computing.
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Figure 1 The Common Gateway Interface (CGI) (adopted from [1))
Since CGI scripts allow anyone on the Web to run a program on the server based on any
input they choose to supply, CGI executables are probably the largest security risk for the
Web sites [4, 7, 9]. The problem with CGI scripts is that each one presents yet another
opportunity for exploitable bugs. CGI scripts should be written with the same care and
attention given to Internet servers themselves, because, in fact, they are miniature servers








Figure 2 The CGI execution cycle (adopted from [1))
COl scripts can present security holes in two ways [7] :
1. They may intentionally or unintentionally leak information about the host
system that will help hackers break in.
2. Scripts that process remote user input, such as the contents of a form or a
"searchable index" command, may be vulnerable to attacks in which the
remote user tricks them into executing commands.
Some possible attacks are [9] :
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1. Mailing the password file to the attacker (Wlless shadowed)
2. Mailing a map of the filesystem to tIle attacker
3. Mailing system information from fetc to the attacker
4. Starting a login server on a high port and telneting in
5. Many denial of service attacks: for example, massive file system searches,
suspected infinite loops or other resource consuming commands.
6. Erasing and/or altering the server's log files
Those problems will never happen if CGr transaction is completely disabled, but
powerful and convenient capabilities of cor cannot be utilized. On the other hand, if
COl transaction is fully allowed to every remote user, security risks mentioned above
cannot be avoided. Therefore, it is necessary to research a better CGI environment which
ensures more security and more capability. Chapter nwill discuss numerous related
works which is currently used to resolve those security problems with COL Those
problems with COl transaction model as well as weaknesses of current solutions will be
formally stated in chapter Ill. As a new solution to the problems, Secure and Flexible




1. Writing secure CGI scripts
Whenever a program is interacting with a networked client, there is the possibility of
that client attacking the program to gain unauthorized access to the resources of the
server. Even the most innocent looking script can be very dangerous to the integrity of
computer systems. With that in mind, Stein [4] and NCSA (The National Center for
Supercomputing Applications) at UillC (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) [7]
presented valuable guidelines to making sure that a software program does not come
under attack. Following is a summary of those guidelines:
Beware of the eval statement
Languages like PERL and the Bourne shell provide an eval command which allows one
to construct a string and have the interpreter execute that string [14]. This can be very
dangerous. Observe the following statement in the Bourne shell:
eval 'echo $QUERY_STRING Iawk 'BEGIN {RS="&"} {printf"QS_%s\n",$l}"
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This script takes the query string, and converts it into a set of variable set commands.
The interpreter executes those commands at the end. If the query string contains "rm -r'·.
this short script may destroy the whole directory structure under current directory.
Do not trust the client to do anything
A well-behaved client will escape any characters which have special meaning to the
Boume shell in a query string and thus avoid problems with the CGI script
misinterpreting the characters. A mischievous client may use special characters to confuse
the CGr script and to gain unauthorized access.
Be careful with popen and system commands.
If any data from the client is used to construct a command line for a call to popenO or
systemO, be sure to place backslashes before any characters that have special meaning to
the Bourne shell before calling the function.
2. CGI wrapper program
Most Hyper-text Transmission Protocol Daemons (HTTPDs) do not change user ID to a
COl script's owner. Instead they run the program as "nobody", since effective user ID of
7
CGr process is to be set same as executor's user ill, which is nobody [5, 13]. CGI scripts
available on the Internet assume that the CGr script will be run as nobody so they require
either files to be world-writable or CGls to be Superuser ill (SUID). One, however,
almost never need files to be world-writable. Usually a directory can be made world-
writable so that the CGI can create files owned by nobody. Directory permission can be
restored afterwards. This is not a very good idea since other users can access those
world-accessible files at the same time, too. In addition to it, nobody scripts are too
limited to provide advanced CGI services, since they cannot access files other then world-
accessible files. Figure 3 shows how nobody CGI script works. In this case, incoming
remote user tries to execute local user choim's COl executable. Process real user ill is
set to choim's but effective user ID is nobody's. It means that the COl process is as
exactly powerful as nobody who only can access world-accessible resource domain.
local server
resource






















is same as noOOdy's
Figure 3 "nobody" eGI execution
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The user with U1D 0 is special and called the superuser (or root) [15]. The superuser
has the power to read, write and execute all files in the system, no matter who owns them
and no matter how they are protected. Making scripts sum is very dangerous if
implementers of the CGI scripts are malicious [4, 13]. For example, in a university
machine with many users or in a commercial Internet service provider's machine, it is not
safe to trust the other users. SUID scripts have many more potential security holes than
normal CGI scripts. It is impossible to have a secure SUID shell script on some operating
systems. The simplest methods for attacking SUlD scripts depend on setting environment
variables maliciously. Figure 4 illustrates how CGI executable can be executed on behalf
of superuser. To make sum CGI process, owner of CGI executable has to be superuser
and its set-user ill bit must be on [13,15]. For example,
$ chown root test.cgi
$ chmod 4711 test.cgi


















Set-user ID bit is on.
Figure 4 sum eGI execution
CGI process
Effecti~e UID
is same as roors
The program CGlwrap which is developed by Nathan Neulinger is a good way to allow
users to run CGIs under their own UTD [6]. Figure 5 shows how it works. However,
CGJwrap does not have capabilities to achieve more flexible and secure approach to the
user directory mapping. For the duration of the CGI transaction, CGI script only can
access resources with same UrD of CGJ script with Nathan Neulinger's CGlwrap. In
addition to it, malicious remote or local user can by-pass CGlwrap and are able to directly
access to the local CGI executables and resources. Thus, more flexibl.e and secure CGI
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and execute CGI execulable
by uling exec Iyltem call
CHAPTER III
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Writing secure eGI scripts enhance eGr security, but it is not secure enough when
attackers make eGI scripts which has intentionally injected malicious features such as
mailing important system files such as password file and log files of the server.
eGl wrapper program such as eGlwrap is a good way to allow users to run eGIs
under their own urn. It means that wrapper partially solves surD eGI execution
problems and nobody eGI execution limitations, since it gives eGl owner's UfD to
users who wants to run those eGIs. It means every user who wants to run the same
CGI script will have the same access privilege since the eGl script run under eGI
executable owner's UIn [6]. This situation is considered too restrictive ancl
inflexible. CGlwrap can be by-passed and server system may be enclangered.
Different users of a eGI executable also cannot be applied by different access
privileges. Thus, an advanced eGI wrapper system which is capable of better security
and capabiJity is necessary.
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CHAPTER IV
SECURE AND FLEXIBLE CGI WRAPPER (SFW) ORGANIZATION
1. Apache suEXEC Support
Apache WWW server was originally based on code and ideas found in the most popular
HTTP server of the time NCSA (The National Center for Supercomputing Applications)
httpd 1.3 (early 1995). It has since evolved into a far superior system which can rival
almost any other UNIX based HTTP server, in terms of functionality, efficiency and
speed [13]. Since it began, it has been completely rewritten, and includes many new
features. Apache is the most popular WWW server on the Internet (13].
The suEXEC feature, which was introduced in Apache 1.2, provides Apache users the
ability to run CGI programs through dedicated CGI wrapper program [13]. Apache
HTTPD is freeware. Thus, new CGI wrapper can be implemented on apache suEXEC
support.
The configuration of suEXEC is a four step process: configure CGJ wrapper source
code to make it suitable for given Web server, compile wrapper program, place the




By default, Apache is compiled to look for the suEXEC wrapper location srclhttpd.h.
The following defines the path to the suEXEC wrapper:
#define SUEXEC_BIN "/usr/local/apache/sbin/suexec"
If the installation requires location of the wrapper program in a different directory, editing
src/httpd.h and recompiling Apache server is required.
After COl wrapper program is compiled, it has to be placed at the defined location for
SUEXEC_BIN. In order for the wrapper to set the user lD, it must be installed as owner
"root" and must the set user TD execution bit set is on. Examples are given below:
chown root /usr/local/apachelsbin/suexec [ENTER]
chmod 47J1 /usr/locaf/apache/sbin/suexec [ENTER]
After properly installing the CGI wrapper executable, the apache server needs to be
killed and restarted. Upon startup of the web-server, if Apache finds a properly
configured CGl wrapper, it will print the following message to the console:
Configuring Apache for use with su.exec wrapper.
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If this message does not appear at server startup, the server is most likely not fmding the
wrapper program where it expects it, or the executable is not owned by root, or the
executable's set user ID bit is off.
The primary benefit from the apache suEXEC support is that no remote user can
possibly by-pass CGI wrapper program. Every CGI transaction can be security checked
and log-in controlled by the properly implemented and configured CGI wrapper. It is
very important since making of security CGI wrapper is not possible without this kind of
Web server support.
2. suEXEC Security Model
suEXEC is based on a setuid CGI "wrapper" program that is called by the main Apache
web server. This wrapper is called when an HTTP request is made for a CGI program
that the administrator has designated to run with user ID other than that ofthe main
server. The wrapper employs the following procudure [13]. The security model employs
several checks to determine success or failure -- if anyone of these conditions fail, the
program logs the failure and exits with an error, otherwise it will continue:
1. Was the wrapper called with the proper number ofarguments?
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The wrapper will only execute if it is given the proper number of arguments. The
proper argument format is known to the Apache web server. If the wrapper is not
receiving the proper number of arguments, it is either being hacked, or there is
something wrong with the suEXEC wrapper system.
2. Is the user executing this wrapper a valid user ofthis system?
This is to ensure that the user executing the wrapper is truly a user of the system.
A special user name "nobody" or "www" is used, in general.
3. Is this valid user allowed to run the wrapper?
[s this a user allowed to run this wrapper? Only one user (the Apache user) is
allowed to execute the program. Direct execution of the wrapper program must
be prohibited.
4. Does the target program have an unsafe hierarchical reference?
The target program which contains a leading 'I' or has a I • .' back-reference is not
allowed and the target program must reside within the Apache web space.
5. Is the target user name valid?
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Every CGl resource has its owner. To ensure that owner's user name exists in the
local system, UNIX password file (/etc/passwd) must be referenced.
6. Is the target group name valid?
The owner of CGl resource can be a member of one or more group(s). To ensure
that owner's group name exists in the local system, UNIX group file (Jetc/group)
must be referenced.
7. Is the target user superuser?
SUID CGI execution has potential security risk, since the CGI process wilillave
same access privileges as superuser.
8. Is the target userid grater than the minimum ID number?
The minimum user ID number is specified during configuration. This allows to
set the lowest possible user ill that will be allowed to execute COl programs.
This is useful to block out "system" accounts.
9. Is the target group the superuser group?
17
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Members in the superuser group has same access privileges as superuser. SUlD
CGI execution has potential security risk, since the COl process will have same
access privileges as superuser.
iD.is the target group ID grater than the minimum iD number?
The minimum group ill number is specified during configuration. This allows to
specify the lowest possible group ID that will be allowed to execute CGr
programs. This is useful to block out "system" groups.
f 1. Can the wrapper successfully become the target user and group?
CGI program acquires the target user and group via setuid and setgid calls. The
group access list is also initialized with all of the groups of which the user is a
member.
i2. Does the directory in which the program resides exist?
Non-existence of directory implies given file name is invalid.
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13. Is the directory within the Apache webspace?
If the request is for a regular portion of the server, the requested directory has to
be within the server's document root. Uthe request is for a user directory, usually
specified by -<user_name>, the requested directory has to be within the user's
document root such as -choimlpublic_html.
14. Is the directory writable by anyone else?
Only the owner user may be able to alter contents of the target directory. It means
that the owner of the target directory is supposed to be the only one who can
access it.
15. Does the target program exist?
Non-existence of the target COL program implies that the file does not exist.
Thus, there is no means to execute the target COL program.
J6. Is the target program writable by anyone else?
If anyone other than the owner can possibly alter the COL program, the CGI
program can be replaced by a malicious cor program.
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17. Is the target program setuid or setgid?
If the target CGI program is setuid or setgid program, it will change urn and GID
of the target CGI process again. This situation is not desirable, since the target
CGI program is supposed to be executed on behalf of its owner's IDs.
18. Is the target user/group the same as the program's user/group?
The target user and group name have to be same as target CGI program's user and
group name.
/9. Can the process environment successfully clean the process environment (0 ensure
safe operations?
A wrapper program designated by suEXEC support cleans the process'
envirorunent variables by establishing a safe execution PATH (defined during
configuration), as well as only passing through those variables whose names are
listed in the safe environment list (also created during configuration).
20. Can the wrapper process successfully become the target program and execute?
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The wrapper process executes target CGI program by invoking one of the exec
UNIX system calls.
SFW must be compliant on this security model in order that the wrapper program takes
advantage of Apache Web server's suEXEC support. CGI resources which are under the
control of the SFW CGI transaction environment must be set up on this security model as
well.
3. Apache user authentication and access control module
User authentication module of the apache server allows the web administrators to
control access to documents on an individual user basis by utilizing user and passwords
Iists to provide the necessary authentication [5]. When a remote user tries to access a
restricted portion of the site, the server requires the user to log in by specifying a
username and a password. If the user supplies the proper information, access is granted
to that user to across the site without additional login requests. (Although the user does
not enter a password, the usemame and password get re-sent by the browser with each
new request to the protected realm.) User authentication based on access control provides
more selecti.ve security because access permission is validated on a per-user basis.
Apache requires login and a password validation before granting access to a restricted
portion of web site [13]. It is important to note that there is no correlation between the
21
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UNIX password file (/etc/passwd) and the server's password files; it is not necessary for a
remote user to have an account on the local system to be able to access protected
materials on a Web server. To provide user authentication, a password file and group file
have to be created and maintained properly. By also using a group file, access restrictions
based on the user's group memberships can be established. For the Secure and Flexible
cor Wrapper, a built-in resource-user mapping application called sfwmapper creates,
modifies and mai.ntains a password file and a group file. This topic will be fully covered
in chapter 5.
Host-based access control grants or denies access depending on the lnternet Protocol
(IP) address of the machine that generated the request. This system is the least intrusive
to legitimate users because access is granted on the basis of the machine address.
Machines matching a description are allowed or denied access to documents without
requesting further information from the client. SFW utilizes user authentication based 011
host-based access control. More information will be provided in chapter 6.
4. Essential UNIX System Resources and Functions
Functions for user and group accounting
The UNIX system password file contains the fields shown in Table 1. These fields are
members of a system defined structure called passwd that is defined in <pwd.h> header
file [15]. Each line of password file contains the seven fields shown in Table 1, separated
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by colons. User name is a unique string which identifies user in the local system. There
are numerous special purpose user names in UNIX system. Two of them are closely
related to this research. First special system user name is root. It is a special user name
for the super user who is able to access aU system resources with no limitation at all.
Table I Fields in password file (adopted from [15])
Description structpasswd member
User name char *pw_name
Encrypted password char *pwyasswd
Numerical user ill uid_t pw_uid
Numerical group ID gid_tpwyid
Comment field char *pw~ecos
Initial working directory char *pw_dir
Initial shell (user program) char *pw_shell
Second one is nobody. This system user name can be used by network servers that
allow users login to a system, but with a user ID and group TO that provides no privileges.
The only files that users can access with this user ill and group 10 are those that are
readable or writable by the world.
The encrypted password field contains a copy of the user's password that has been put
through a one-way encryption algorithm. The algorithm that is currently used always
generates 13 printable characters form the 64-character set [a-zA-ZO-9./] [15]. Some
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fields in a password file entry can be empty. lfthe encrypted password field is empty, it
usually means the user does not have a password. An empty comment field has no effect.
There are two functions, getpwuid and getpwnam, to fetch entries from the password
file. These two functions allow one to look up an entry given a user's login name or user
ill. Figure 6 shows prototypes of the functions.
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
struct passwd *getpwuid(uid_t uid);
struct passwd *getpwnam(const char *name);
Figure 6 Functions for the password file (adopted from (15))
The UNIX group file contains the fields shown in Table 2. These fields are contained
in a group structure that is defined in <grp.h>.
Table 2 Fields in group file (adopted from [15 J)
Description struct group member
Group name char *gr_name
Encrypted password char "'gryasswd
Numerical group 10 inl gr_gid
Array of pointers to individual user names char **gr_mem
24
The field gr_mem is an array of pointers to the user names that belong to this group.
This array is terminated by a null pointer. Either a group name or a numerical group 10
can be looked up by the two functions shown in Figure 7.
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <grp.h>
struct group *getgrgid(gid_t gid);
struct group *getgrnam(const chat *name);
Figure 7 Functions for group file (adopted from [15])
File Information, Type and Permission
Given a path name, the stat function retums a structure of information about the named
file. The fstat fWIction obtains information about the file that is already open. The Istat
function is similar to stat, but when the named file is a symbolic link, Istat returns
information abollt the symbolic link. The Secure and Flexible Wrapper program utilizes
Istat function to avoid following symbolic links. With stat function family, following file
information is returned in a system stat structure [15]:
• File type and mode (pennissions)
• i-node number
• Device number
• Device number for special files
• Number of links
25
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• User ID of owner
• Group ill of owner
• Size in bytes
• Time infonnation
• Best va block size
• Number of blocks allocated
Whenever a remote user accesses CGr program through the Secure and Flexible
Wrapper, the wrapper checks target CGI program file with Istat nmction.
The type of a file is encoded in the st_mode number of the stat structure. The type of
file can be tested by system macros such as S_rSREGO, S_rSDIRO and S_ISLNKO [15].
The S rSREGO macro tests whether or not the given file is a regular file. The S ISDIRO- -
macro checks if the given file is a directory. Similarly, the S_ISLNKO macro examine if
the given file is a symbolic link.
The st_mode val ue also encodes the access permission bits for the file. There are nine
permission bits for each file, divided into three categories. These are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Nine file access permission bits (adopted from [15])















The chrnod command and system function is typically used to modify these nine
permission bits. The set-user-lO bit and set-group-TO bit of executable files also can be
set by chmod command or system function. For example,
$ chmod 4711 sfiv<enter>
makes the sfw CGr wrapper program a world executable set-user-TO program. It means
that this program will be executed on behalf of owner's access privileges.
Changing User IDs and Group IDs
A running instance of a program is called a process. Every process has at least six lOs
associated with it. The real user ID and real group ID identify whom the process really
belongs to. Normally these values do not change during a login session, although there
are ways for a superuser process to change them. These ways are utilized to change IDs
of the requested CGr process. The effective user 10, effective group 10 and
supplementary group IDs determine file access permissions [15]. These effective lOs
reflects who executes the program usually. However, program owner's IDs can be
27
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assigned, if the program is set-user-ID or set-group-ID [13]. For example, if the owner of
the file is the super user and if the file's set-user-ill bit is set, then while that program file
is running as a process, it has super user privileges. This is very important feature, since
HTIPD user (normally nobody) can execute the Secure and Flexible Wrapper program
associated with root's effective IDs. The saved set-user-ID and saved set-group-ID
contain copies of the effective user ill and effective group ID when a program is
executed. An unprivileged user can set its effective user ill to either its real user ill or its
saved set-user-ID.
The real IDs and effective IDs can be changed by functions shown in Figure 8. The
setuid function sets real user ID and effective user ill at the same time. Similarly group
Figure 8 Functions for cbanging real and effective IDs (adopted from ILS])







int setegid(gid_t gid); /* returns 0 if OK, -1 on error */
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Environment list and CGr Environment Variables
CGI environment variables are a set of special variables that are set in the environment
when a CGI program is requested [1]. These variables are accessed via a global array
called environment list [15]. Like the argument list, the environment list is an array of
character pointers, with each pointer containing the address of a null-terminated string.
The address of the array of pointers is contained in the global variable called environ r13,
is]. Following is the definition of this variable:
extern char *environ;

















Figure 9 Environment variable list (adopted from [I 5))
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Each string is explicitly tenninated by null characters. In addition to it, the environment
list is terminated by NULL. By convention the environment consists of "name=value"
strings, as shown in Figure 9. CGI environment variables also can be obtained by
referencing the list. Table 4 swnmarizes major CGI environment variables.



















The host name or IP address on which the CGI program is running,
as it appears in the URL.
The type of server: for example, CERN/3.0 or NCSAJI.3.
The version of CGI: for example CG IlL I
The version ofHTTP: for example HTTP/l.O
The TCP POlt on which the server is running. Usually POl1 80 is
assigned for WWW servers.
POST or GET.
A list of Content-types the browser can accept directly.
Browser inJol1mtion.
The URL of the document that this form submission came from.
Extra path information, as sent by the browser using the query
method of GET in a fonn.
The actual system-specitic path name of the path contained in
PATH iNFO.
The path name to the CGI executable.
The arguments to the script or the form input (if submitted using
GET). QUERY_STRING contains everything after the question
mark in the URL.
The name of the host that submitted the executable. This value
CaJIDO! be set.
The IP address of the host that submitted the executable.
The name of the user that submitted the executable. This value will






In forms submitted wilh POST, the value
For [Olms submitted with POST, the nwnber of bytes in the
standard input.
chdir, fchdir and getcwd functions
Every process has a current working directory. This directory is where the search for all
relative path names starts. Improper setting of current working directory ofCGI process
implies possible security risk, since same relative path names may be translated into
different absolute path names on different current working directory information. Cunellt
working directory of the calling process can be changed by calling the chdir or fchdir
functions [15].
#include <unistd.h>
int chdir(const char *pathname);
int fchdir(int ,filedes); /* returns 0 if OK, -Ion error */
char *getcwd(char *buf, size_t size); /* returns bufifOK, NULL on error"'/
Figure 10 Functions for changing current working directory (adopted from [15])
As shown in Figure 10, either a pathname or an open file descriptor specifies the new
current working directory. The absolute path name of current working directory can be
retrieved by the getcwd function also. Valid CGI programs are supposed to be under the
user document root directory such as ~username/public_html/cgi-bin [3]. These




Replacing current process by the new program with exec function
When a process calls one of the exec functions, that process is completely replaced by
the new program, and the new program starts executing at its main ftmction. The process
ill does not change across an exec since a new process is not created but the old process
is replaced. The exec function merely replaces the current process with a new process.
There are six different exec functions in UNIX system [15]. Table 5 shows the
differences between the six exec functions.
Table 5 Differences between six exec functions (adopted from [15])
Function pathname filename Arg list argv[] environ envp[]
exec1 • • •
execlp • • •
execle • • •
execv • • •
execvp • • •
execve • • •
letter p I v e
Almost every COl wrapper implementation utilizes this technique to replace a properly
wrapped COl wrapper process with a requested COl program [6, 13]. In that way, the
requested CGI process can be executed using the owner's access privileges. The full
pathname information, argument list and environment variable list has to be passed to the
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target CGI program. Thus, execv function is considered as appropriate for implementing
cor wrapper program in this research.
5. SFW Resource-User Mapper
The user-resource mapper of the SFW consists of three components, which are SFW
password file handler, SFW group file handler and SFW mapping constraint tile
interpreter. To utilize the user and group authentication mentioned in chapter 3, SFW has
to maintain its own password file and group file (Ietc/sfwyasswd and letc/sfw_group) for
user and group authentication. Each line of the SFW user-resource mapping constraint
file is also interpreted into the global access configuration file (ACF) which is also
descri bed in chapter 3.
Each line of the SFW password file consists of a login ID and its password. The
encrypted password field contains a copy of the user's password that has been put through
a one-way encryption algorithm. The algorithm that is currently used always generates 13
printable characters form the 64-character set [a-zA-ZO-9.1] [5, 15]. For example, a line
of the SFW password file looks like "choim:kadKUREkd234 ".
This file has same structural format as UNIX system password file explained in chapter




Groups are simply a way of providing an alias for a set ofusers. Each line ofthe SFW
group file contains a group name and the user IDs that make up that group. For example,
consider the line:
mygroup: choim, kim, john
This line defines a group named mygroup and its group members choim, kim and john. It
also has same structural format as UNIX group file, but only used for the SFW group
authentication purpose.
SFW resource-user mapper interprets a resource-user mapping constraint file and
configures the SFW section of the global access control file (ACF) [13J according to the
interpretation from the mapper. The resource-user mapping constraint file has
information about access controlled SFW COl resources, users, groups and hosts. For
example:
/home/choim/public_htmllcgi-bin *. bad. org kim, lee mygroup
This line implies following information:
• Absolute pathname of CGI resource is /home/choim/public_html/cgi-bin.
• Access from the domain bad.org to this resource will be denied.
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• Access by the users kim and lee is allowed. However those users must provide
their user IDs and passwords in order to enter the resource space.
• Access by the group mygroup is allowed. However members of the group mllst
provide their user IDs and passwords in order to enter the resource space.
Obviously, user names and group names have to be pre-defined in the SFW password
file and group file. Finally, SFW resource-user mapper configures the global ACF based
on the interpretation of the resource-user mapping constraint file. Figure lllllustrates
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Figure 11 SFW mapper design
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6. CGI Transaction Procedure on SFW
When a remote user requests COl transaction to HTTPD, the server retrieves pathname
of target cor program, its owner's user rD, its owner's group ID and argument list for the
CGI program. Then, the server executes SFW and passes these four data as arguments to
the SFW process, SFW process, now, follows the security check procedure described in
the suEXEC security model (see chapter 2) [13]. If any security check fails, SFW
discards current COl transaction request and logs error messages to SFW log file
(Ivar/l0 g/httpd/sfwJog). HTTPD also sends an error message ,such as intemal server
error, to the remote user's browser. If every security check has been successfully passed,
SFW process changes its user IDs and group IDs same as the owner's. Then, it executes
the target COL program with exec system function. The execv system function is
preferable since the argument list and environment list has to be passed to the target COl
program (see chapter 4). Upon execution of the target COl program, the global ACF and
the SFW resource-user mapping constraint files are referenced. If the target COl program
is access controlled resource, the remote user will be prompted by the authentication
module to provide correct SFW user name and password. lfthe remote user entered
correct user fD and correct password, the requested COl program is executed and the user
gets the result from it. Note that successful SFW COl transactions are also logged in the
SFW log file. Figure 12 Illustrates SFW COl transaction system. Gray filled components
































SECURE AND FLEXIBLE cor WRAPPER: RESULTS
As discussed in chapter N, Secure and Flexible CGl Wrapper (SFW) utilizes three
system files, which are a SFW user password file (/etc/sfw-passwd), a SFW group file
(/etc/sfw_group) and a SFW resource-user mapping constraint file (.Ir_u_map). An
example SFW user password file is given in Figure 13. It has four users and their one-
way encrypted passwords. Remote users who want to access restricted CGI resources
must use those user names and corresponding passwords in order to be authenticated.
#








Figure 13 Example SFW user password file
An example SFW group file is shown in Figure 14. It defines three SFW user groups.
Groups are simply a way of providing an alias for a set of users. Group information is not
required by SFW, but users can be easily grouped with it.
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project: kim, lee, joe
Figure 14 Example SFW group file
An example SFW resource-user mapping constraint file is shown in Figure 15. It
indicates that four CGI resources are under access control of SFW. The authentication
behavior of SFW will be determined by these mapping constraints. For example, the first
line implies that user "kim" and "lee" will be authenticated when they access to the CGr
resource "lhome/choim/public_html/cgi-bin".
#
# SFW Resource-User Map File
# Format: <CGI_resouree_name> <Host_nameJist> <User_nameJist> <Group_nameJist>
# Remark: - indicates null list
#
Ihome/choim/public_html/cgi-bin - kim,lee -
Ihome/minsu/public_html/cgi-bin "'.bad.org - party
fhome/john/public_htmllcgi-bin - - project
fhome/jane/public_htmllcgi-bin/locaI3gi/- - project
Figure 15 Example SFW resource-user map files
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Note that resource names are absolute path names of directories or files of the local
system. Their URLs will vary. For example, an absolute pathname
/home/choim/public_htmVcgi_bin is equivalent to http://localhostJ-choim/cgi-bin.
When a remote user accesses a CGI resource controlled by SFW, the user will be
prompted to enter his SFW user name and password as illustrated in Figure 16. If the
user accesses CGI resources that do not require authentication, she/he will not be
prompted to provide access authentication information.
~I
Figure 16 User name and password required by SFW mapper
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As specified in the SFW resource-user mapping constraint file in Figure 15, SFW user
"kim" and "lee" are only allowed access. For illustration, user name "kim" and its correct
password are entered as shown in Figure 17.
~I
Figure 17 Valid user name and password
After the remote user clicks on OK button on the authentication di.aJog box in Figure
17, the HTTPD automatically transfers its control to the SFW process. Then, SFW runs
the requested COl program (-choimlcgi-binltest.cgi) on behalf of the COl program
owner. The requested cor program "test.cgi" in this example is actually a simple COl
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script that shows its IDs and two COl environment variables, REMOTE_USER and
REMOTE_HOST. The information displayed is shown in Figure 18. It is very obvious
that those user IDs and group IDs 500 are same as the COl resource owner's user IDs and
group IDs. Following lines of the server log file and SFW log file show that the COl
program was successfully wrapped and executed, and the result was successfully
transmitted back to the remote user's browser.
127.0.0.1 - kim [25/Mar/1998:06:37:20 -06001 "GET /~choim/cgi-binltest.cgi
LP Address Usemame Access Time lnfo Transaction Method CGJ Location
HTTP/l.O" 200 247
HTTP Version Server Status Bytes Transferred
[06:37:1725-03-981: UID: (choim/choim) GID: (choim/choim) test.cgi
Access Time Info Real and Effective UID Real and Effective GID CGI name
Note that server status value of 200 means that the CGI transaction based on SFW was
successful. More detailed example log files are available in Appendix C.
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Hello? :I III the soript )lou requested...
> \lID : 500
> EUID : 500
> G:ID : 500
> EG:ID : 500
Exeouted by kim
from 127.0.0.1
Figure 18 SFW CGI transaction result
What if the remote user enters an invalid user name and/or password? In that case, CGI
transaction request should be denied by the SFW authentication module. Figure 19 and
Figure 20 illustrate this situation. An user name "joe" is not supposed to access the CGI
resource "-choim/cgi-bin/test.cgi". According to the SFW map file, only two users
"kim" and "lee" can utilize the resource. Thus, SFW user "joe" will not be authorized.
The remote user's access request will be denied.
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~ ~ ~ ~ ------- ~-~-- - - - ~ - ----- - - - - -
I' 'O/E.. f1etsC<\f)e f1avigatnr 4.04 !!'~
File Edit View Go Communicator
'. ttp: Illocalhost/.... choim./cgi-bin/test. cgi
********1
Enter usemame for SFW security check at localhost
User 10: :=-:=-_.:=========:::::.
Password:
Figure 19 Invalid user name and password
The remote user may retry to enter correct user name and password as many times as he
wants. If the user decides not to retry anymore, however, server error message will be
transmitted back to the browser as shown in Figure 21. Following line from the server
log file shows that the requested CGI transaction was not too successful.
127.0.0. J - joe [25/Mar/l998:06:38:3J -0600/ "GET /-choim/cgi-bin/test.cgi
IP Address Usemame Access Time Info Transaction Method CGI Location
HTTP/l.O" 401 350
HTTP Version Server Status Bytes Transferred





Figure 20 Access denied
,
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Thi.s SUVel could not verify that you are authorized to access the document you requeste.d. Either you






Reload Home Search Guide
File Edit View Go Communicator
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t... Uetscaf)e: 401 Authorization Requirecl
I







As mentioned in problem statement, the Common Gateway Interface (COl) has
numerous server-side security problems. Current solutions to the problems are not good
enough to secure it and to deliver its full power. In usual cases, more security means less
flexibility (for example, "nobody" CGI execution model shown in Figure 3); more
flexibility means less security (for example, SUrD COl execution model shown in Figure
4). Thus, a new CGI wrapper system called Secure and Flexible CGI Wrapper (SFW) has
been designed, implemented and tested in this research. As discussed in the body section
of this thesis, the new COl wrapper system is capable of performing mandatory security
checks based on the suEXEC security model. It executes a target COl program with its
owner's lOs in response to authorized remote users, based on pre-configured resource-
user mapping constraints information. SFW system has numerous advantages over
previous solutions discussed in the problem statement of this paper. SFW can be
maintained with minimal cost and maintenance since numbers of features are effectively
integrated in one system and its configuration procedures are significantly simple and
straight forward. SFW is able to significantly enhance server-side security since it has a
mandatory security checking routine and a dedicated user authentication module and cor
resource wrapping capability. Besides, source codes in C programming language can be




trusted gateway agent [8], easily establishes more secure and flexible CGI transaction
environment for sure. Figure 22 illustrates a properly configured CGl transaction
environment based on the SFW suite; gray filled portion of the figure was implemented
as a part of this research. Source codes in C are available in Appendix A; example
configuration files are listed in Appendix B; example SFW log files are placed in
Appendix c.
Figure 22 SFW eGI transaction environment
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# Make file for secure & flexible wrapper
#
# To compile, type "make".
# To clean up, type "make clean".
#
# By Minsu Choi
# Graduate Student
# Computer Science Dept.
# Oklahoma State University
# Stillwater, Oklahoma
#
all : sfw sfwmapper
.PHONY : all
sfw sfw.o
cc -0 sfw sfw.o
sfwmapper : sfwmapper.o
cc -0 sfwmapper sfwmapper.o
sfw.o : sfw.c sfw.h
cc -c sfw.c
sfwmapper.o : sfwmapper.c sfwmapper.h
cc -c sfwmapper.c
clean










* Secure & Flexible Wrapper
* Header file for sfw.c
*
* by Minsu Choi
* Graduate Student
* Computer Science Dept.








#include <sys/stat.h> /* for file permission stating */
#include <sys/param.h> /* for parameter manipulation */
#include <errno.h> /* for error handling */
#include <stdlib.h> /* for standard library functions */
#include <stdarg.h> /* for standard arguments */
#include <pwd.h> /* forpassword file handling */
#include <grp.h> /* forpassword file handling */
#include <unistd.h> /* for setting user id */
#include <sys/types.h> /* types for uid */
#include <string.h> /* for string manipulation */
#include <time.h> /* time for logging */
#include <syslog.h> /* for system log file generation */
/* Define who runs httpd. Usually nobody */
#define HTTPD USER "nobody"
...,
/* CGl path */
#define CGl PATH "/public_html/cgi-bin/"
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/* SFW log file location */
#define LOG SFW "/var/log/httpd/sfw_log"
/* user document root */
#define USER DIR "public_html"
/* system document root */
#define DOC ROOT "/home/httpd/html"
/* safe path info */
#define SAFE PATH "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin"
/* minimum UID and GID (lower IDs are assigned system users) */
#define MIN UID 500




/* maximum length of path */
/* maximum number of environment variables */















/* SFW log file */
/* environment variable list */
8192#define MAX PATH
static FILE *log file;




















" REMOTE_ ADDR " ,
































* Secure & Flexible Wrapper
* Source code in C
*
* by Minsu Choi
* Graduate Student
* Computer Science Dept.
* Oklahoma State Diversity
* Stillwater, Oklahoma
*/
/* header file of header files */
#include "sfw.h" ..
/* writes message into log file */
void log_msg(const char *format str, ... )
time t curr time;
va list v_list; /* varable argument list */






struct tm *local time; /* structured current time */
/* open log file if it is closed */
if (!log_file)
if ((log_file = fopen(LOG SFW, "a")) NULL)
fprintf(stderr, "failed to open log file\n")
perror (II fopen")
exit (1) ;
/* prepare to get variable argument list */
va start (v_list, format str)
/* get current time in numerical format */
time (&curr time)
/* convert it into human recognizable time */
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local time localtime(&curr time);
/* write time info into the log file */
fprintf(log file, "[%.2d:%.2d:%.2d %.2d-%.2d-%.2d]
local_time->tm_hour, local time->tm_min,
local_time->tm_sec, local_time->tm_mday,
(local time->tm mon + 1), local time->tm year)
/* write messages into the log file */
vfprintf(log file, format str, v list);
/* flush log file pointer */
fflush(log_file) ;
/* specifies end of variable argument list */
return;
void main(int argc, char *argv[])
char *user name; /* user name */-
char *group_name; /* group name */
char *real user_name; /* real user name */











/* script name */
/* ex : test.cgi */
/* script owner's home dir */
/* ex : /home/choim */
/* path where scipt exists */
/* ex : /home/choim/public_html/cgi-bin */
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char *script_full-path; /* script_path + script_name */
/* ex : /home/choim/public_html/
cgi-bin/test.cgi*/









/* current working directory */
/* document working directory */
/* checks - */
/* UID of secure & flexible wrapper */
/* UID of owner */
/* GID of owner */
/* password information structure
for owner */
/* for executer of script */






struct stat script stat; /* for file stating */
char tmp_path[512] /* temporary storage for path info */
char **safe env; /* safe environment variable pointer */
char **env ptr; /* temp env pointer */
int env index; /* index for checking env var list */-
int tmp_index; /* same as above */
/* apache server passes 4 arguments user name, group name
eGI program name and arguments to the program */
if(argc!=4)
log_msg("incorrect number of arguments.\n")
exit (101) ;
/* retrive script name */
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script name strdup(argv[3)) ;
1* figure out who owns script */
user name = strdup(argv[l]);
group name = strdup(argv[2]);
1* get UIO of sfw process *1
sfw UIO = getuid();
1* figure out who wants to execute eGI script *1
if(! (execute_user=getpwuid(sfw_UIO)))
1* executer not found in password file */
log msg("Executer of script is not found in password file\n");
exit(102) i
} ;
1* script name check
contains leading /?
contains leading .. /?
contains any .. ? *1
l.f((scnpt name[O]=='/') II
(!strncmp(script_name," .. /",3)) II
(strstr(script_name,"/ .. /") != NULL))
log msg(IIscript name check failure (%s)\n", script_name);
exit (104) ;
};
/* HTTPO user and executor are same? */
if(strcmp(HTTPD_USER,execute_user->pw_name) )






/* user name check




/* check password info of owner */
if(! (owner=getpwnam(user_name)))
/* owner not found */




/* check group info of owner */
if (strlen(group_name) !=strspn(group_name, "0123456789"))
if ( (group=getgrnam (group_name) ) ==NULL)
/* group not found */
















/* log request */
log msg("UIO: (%s/%s) G10: (%s/%s) %s\n",user_name,real user_name,
group_name, real_group_name, script_name) i
/* user 10 minimum check */
if ((UID==O) II (UID<M1N UIO) )
10g_msg(lIminimum UIO check failed (%d/%s) \n",UIO, script_name) ;
exit(107) i
} i
/* group 10 minimum check */
if ((GID==O) II (GID<M1N_GID))
log_msg(lIminimum G10 check failed (%d/%s)\n",G10,script name);
exit(108) ;
} ;
/* Now, change UIO and G10 with setuid and setgid */
if (setgid (GID) ! =0)
log_msg ("setgid failed (%d/%'s) \n", GIO, script_name) ;
exit (109) ;
} ;
if (setuid (UID) ! =0)





/* get the current working directory */
if (getcwd(cwd,MAX_PATH)==NULL)
10g_msg(lIcannot get current working directory\n");
exit(lll) i
};
/* path check */
if (user_dir flag) /* user dir */
if( ((chdir(owner_home)) !=O) I I
( (chdir (USER_DIR» ! =0) II
((getcwd(dwd,MAX PATH))==NULL) I I
( (chdir (cwd) ) ! =0»)
/* go to home dir first */
/* and then public html */
/* and then get
document dir */
/* then go to current dir */
{




if(((chdir(DOC_ROOT))!=O)II /* go to system doc root */
((getcwd(dwd,MAX_PATH»==NULL) I I /* get the path */
( (chdir (cwd) ) ! =0) ) /* then go to current dir * /




/* comapre suffix of current working directory and
document working directory */
if( (strncmp(cwd,dwd,strlen(dwd))) !=O)





/* stat the current working directory */
if ( ((lstat (cwd, &path_st.at) ) ! =0) II
/* make sure it is directory */
log_msg( P1 dirctory stat failed: (%s)\nPl,cwd);
exit (115) ;
} ;
/* check current. directory is not writable by other */
if((path_stat.st_mode&8_IWOTH) I I
(path stat.st_mode&8 IWGRP))
log_msg("directory is writable by others: (%s)\nPl,cwd);
exit (116) ;
/* check CGr program file */
if (( (lstat (script_name. &script_stat)) ! =0) II
/* make sure it is not symbolic link */
(8 18LNK(script stat.st_mode)))
log_msg ("CGI program stat failed: (%s) \n", script_name) ;
exit (117) ;
};
/* check CGI program is not writable by other */
if( (script_stat.st_mode&S_IWOTH) I I
(script_stat.st_mode&S_IWGRP) )





/* check CGI program is setuid or setgid */
if({script_stat.st_mode&S_ISUID) I I /* setuid? */
(script stat. st_mode&S ISG1D)) /* setgid? * /
10g_msg(IICGI program is setuid or setgid:
(%s/%s) \n", cwd, script_name) ;
exit (119) ;
} ;
/* target UID and GID check */
if ( (OID! =path stat. st uid) I I- -
(GID!=path_stat.st_gid) I I
(UID!=script stat.st uid) I I
(GID!=script_stat.st_gid))
log msg (II target UID/GID (%ld/%ld) ", UID, GID) ;
log msg(" mismatch with directory (%ld/%ld) ",path_stat.st uid,
path_stat.st_gid) ;




/* check CGI environment variables */
env_index=O;
1* dynamic allocation of environment variable pointer list */
if({safe_env=(char **)calloc(ENV_BUFF,sizeof(char *)) )==NULL)








/* variables with leading
HTTP are just skipped */
if (!strncmp(*env_ptr,safe_env_lst [tmp_index] ,
strlen(safe env_lst[tmp_index])))






/* modify path info environment variable to block
malicious execution */
sprintf (tmp_path, "PATH=%s" ,SAFE_PATH) ;
safe_env[env_index]=strdup(tmpyath) ;
safe env(++env index]=NULL;
/* copy safe list back to original */
environ=safe_env;
/* close log file */
fclose (log file);
/* assign NULL to make sure that it is closed */
log file=NULL;
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/* execute requested CGI program with exec system call */
execv(script_name,&argv[3]) ;





* Resource-User Mapper for SFW
* Header file for sfwmapper.c
*
* by Minsu Choi
* Graduate Student
* Computer Science Dept.








#define TMP_FILE "/tmp/.sfw_group tmp"
#define ACCESS CONF "/etc/httpd/conf/access.conf"
#define HTPASSWD "/usr/sbin/htpasswd"
#define LF 10
#de fine CR 13
#define MAX ARRAY LEN 300
#define MAX STRING LEN 256
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/*
* Resource-User Mapper for SFW
* Source code in C
*
* by Minsu Choi
* Graduate Student
* Computer Science Dept.









/* SFW group file */
/* temporary flie */
/* SFW map file */
/* SFW configuration file */
char tmp str[MAX STRING_LEN];
char tmpl[MAX_STRING LEN];
char tmp2[MAX STRING LEN];
char tmp3[MAX STRING LEN];
char tmp4[MAX STRING_LEN];
/* temporary strings */
char m_string[MAX_ARRAY_LEN] [MAX_STRING_LEN]; /* map strings */
char host list [MAX_ARRAY_LEN] [MAX STRING LEN] ; /* list of hosts */- -
char user list [MAX_ARRAY_LEN] [MAX STRING LEN] ; /* list of users */-
char group_list [MAX_ARRAY LEN] [MAX STRING LEN] ; /* list of groups */-
char *found group; /* matched group name */
char tmp_char; /* temporary character */
int i, j, k; /* index */





/* number of users */
/* number of groups */
/* flag * /
/* this program is to have 3 arguments
name, option and third argumnt */
if(argc!:3)
printf("Invalid number of arguments.\n")
exit (1) ;
/* examine option */
switch (argv [1] [1] )
{
/* options */
/* option -c makes a SFW passwd file with initial entry */
case Ie':
/* write arguments to temp string buffer */
sprintf(tmp_str, "%s -c %s %s",HTPASSWD,HTPASSWD_FILE,argv[2]);
/* runs apache password file generator */
system (tmp str);
break;
/* option -u adds user */
case 'u':
/* write arguments to temp string buffer */
sprintf(tmp_str, "90s 90s %s",HTPASSWD,HTPASSWD_FILE,argv[2]) i
/* runs apache password file generator */
system (tmp_str) ; /* add or modifiy user */
break;
/* option -C makes SFW group file with initial entry */
case I C' :
/* open SFW group file */
if ( ! (g file:fopen (HTGROUP FILE, "w") ) )
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printf ("Could not open group file. \n") ;
exit (1) ;
} ;
/* get a list of group member */
i=O;
while (I)
printf {"Enter member (enter 0 to end) ,,) ;
scanf ("%s" ,m_string[i]) ;
/* if 0 is entered, stop */
if (strcmp(m_string[i] ,"0")==0) break;
i++;
printf ("Adding group entry %s. \n", argv [2] ) ;
/* write entry to group file */
fprintf (g_file, "%s: ", argv [2] ) ;
i - - .,
/* write group members */
for (j =0; j < i; j ++)
fprintf(g_file, "%s, ",m string[j]);
fprintf(g_file, "%s\n",m_string[j]);
/* close group file */
fclose (g file) ;
break;
/* option -g adds or modify group info */
case 'g':
/* initialize flag */
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/* open group file for read */
if(l (g_file=fopen(HTGROUP_FILE, nrn)))
printf(nCould not open group file.\nn);
exit (1) i
};
/* decide add or modification */
while(!feof(g file))
i = 0;
/* read a line from group file */
while (1)
tmp_str[i] = fgetc(g file);












/* extract group name */
i = 0;
71




/* compare group names */
if(strcmp(found_group,argv[2])==O) m_flag
};
/* no match means addition */
fclose (g_file) ;
/* open group file to append */
If(! (g_file=fopen(HTGROUP FILE, "a")))




/* get list of members */
while(l)
l'I
printf ("Enter member (enter 0 to end) ") ;
scanf ("%8", m...string [i] ) ;
if (strcmp(m_string[i] I "0")==0) break;
i++;
} ;
printf ("Adding group entry %s. \n", argv [2] ) ;






fprintf (g_file, "90s. ", m_string [j) ) ;
fprintf(g_file, "%s\n",m_string[j]) ;
else /* match means modification */
/* close groufile and reopen */
fclose(g file);
1* open group file */
if (! (g_file=fopen (HTGROUP_FILE. " r +")) )
printf("Could not open group file.\n");
exit (1) ;
} ;
/* open temp file */
if(! (tmp_file=fopen(TMP_FILE, "w+")))
printf("Could not open group file.\n");
exit (1) ;
} ;





tmp str[i] = fgetc(g file);
if (feof (g file))




if (tmp_str[i] == 13)
tmp_str[i] = fgetc(g_file);
if ( (tmp_str [i] ==Ox4) II (tmp_str [i] ==10) II (i==255) )




/* skip to delimeter */
while (tmp str [i] ! =' : ,)
i++;
/* copy group name */
tmp_str[i]='\O'i
found_group strdup(tmp_str) ;
/* write all group entries but matched one */
if (strcmp(found_group,argv[2] ) !=O)








/* open group file again */
if (! (g_file=fopen (HTGROUP_FILE, "w") ) )
printf("Could not open group file.\n");
exit (I) i
} ;
/* copy char by char */
tmp char = getc(tmp_file);
while (tmp_char!=EOF)
putc(tmp_char,g_file) i
tmp_char = getc{tmp file} i
} i
/* remove temporary file */
remove{TMP FILE} i
i=O;
/* get list of members */
while(l)
printf("Enter member (enter 0 to end) II} i
scanf("%s",m_string[i]} i
if(strcmp(m string(i], "O")==O} break;
i++i
printf ("Modifing group entry %s. \n", argv [2] ) i
/* write modified group at the end of group file */








/* option -f processes map file */
case I f ':
/* open map file */
if(! {map_file=fopen(argv[2] , "r")))
printf{"Could not open map file.\n");
exit(l} ;
};
/* open access configuration file */
if (! (conf file=fopen (ACCESS CONF, "r") ))
printf("Could not open access configuraion file.\n");
exi t (l) ;
} ;
/* open access configuration file */
if (! (tmp_file=fopen (TMP_FILE, "w+")}}
printf(IICould not open temp file.\n"};
exit(l} ;
};
/* copy block above SFW section */











if (tmp_str[iJ == 13)
fgetc(conf file);
i
if ( (tmp_str [i] ==Ox4) II (tmp_str [i] ==10) II (i==255) )





/* find a line with "# SFW section" */










/* open access configuration file */
if ( ! (conf_file=fopen (ACCESS_CONF, "w+ II) ) )
printf("Could not open access configuraion file.\n");
exit(l) ;
};
/* copy char by char */





/* remove temporary file */
remove (TMP_FILE) i
/* interprete map file line by line */
while(lfeof(map_file) )
i=O;










tmp str[i] fgetc(map_file} ;
if ((tmp_str [i] ==Ox4) II (tmp_str [i] ==10) II (i==255) )




/* if line is not empty and not comment */
if ( (strlen (tmp_str} >O) && (tmp_str [0] ! = I # I) }
/* read four entries */
sscanf(tmp str, "%s %s %s %s",tmp1,tmp2,tmp3,tmp4}j
/* if host list is not empty, get host names */




/* get denied host names */
while(l}
if(tmp2[i]=='\O')
host list [J] [k]
breakj
else
if (tmp2 [i] == I , r )













num host j; /* number of hosts */
/* if user list is not empty, read users */




/* get access controlled user list */
while(l)



















num user j ; /* number of users */
/* if group list is not empty, read them */











group list [j] [k]
break;
else














j; 1* number of groups */
/* writes a directory access control directive
to the access configuration file */
fprintf(conf_file, II <DIRECTORY %s>\n",tmpl);
/* disable user based access control */
fprintf(conf file,"AllowOverride None\n");
/* enable authentication module */
fprintf(conf file, "AuthType Basic\n");
fprintf(conf_file, "AuthName SFW security check\n");
/* SFW user and group file locations */
fprintf (conf file, "AuthUserFile %s\n", HTPASSWD_FILE) ;
fprintf(conf file, "AuthGroupFile %s\n",HTGROUP_FILE);
/* access control for GET and POST methods */
fprintf(conf_file, "<LIMIT GET POST>\n");
/* denied hosts */
if (tmp2 (0) ! = I - , )
fprintf(conf file," deny from II);
for(i=O;i<=num_host;i++)
fprintf(conf file,"%s ",host list[i));
fprintf(conf file,"\n");
/* access controlled users */
if(tmp3(O] !='-')




fprintf(conf_file, "%s ",user list[i]);
fprintf(conf_file, "\n");
} ;
/* access controlled groups */
if (tmp4 [0] ! = I - , )
fprintf(conf file," require group ");
for(i=O;i<=num_group;i++)
fprintf(conf_file, "%s ",group_list[i]);







/* close configuration file */
};
default:


























project: kim, lee, joe
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#






<CGI resource name> <Host name list> <User name list>
<Group name_list>
- indicates null list
/home/choim/public_html/cgi-bin - kim,lee -
/home/minsu/public_html/cgi-bin *.bad.org - party
/home/john/public_html/cgi-bin - - project
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** Log file for CGI transactions based on SFW
#
[03:22:43 18-03-98] UIO: (choim/choim) GIO: (choim/choim) test.cgi
[02:33:20 19-03-98] UIO: {minsu/minsu} GIO: (minsu/minsu) test.cgi
[02:33:20 19-03-98] directory is writable by others:
(/home/minsu/public_html/cgi-bin)
[02:33:35 19-03-98] : UIO: (choim/choim) GIO: (choim/choim) test.cgi
[12:37:38 20-03-98] UIO: (jane/jane) GIO: (j ane/ jane) multiply. cgi
[05:50:45 25-03-98] UIO: (choim/choim) GIO: (choim/choim) test.cgi
[05:56:51 25-03-98] uro: (john/john) GIO: (john/john) counter.cgi





# Global HTTPD log file
#
127.0.0.1 [19/Mar/1998:02:33:29 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-bin/test.cgi
HTTP/1.0" 401 350
127.0.0.1 - park [19/Mar/1998:02:33:29 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-
bin/test. cgi HTTP/ 1. 0" 4 01 350
127.0.0.1 - lee [19/Mar/1998:02:33:35 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-
bin/test.cgi HTTP/1.0" 200 247
127.0.0.1 [20/Mar/1998:12:36:15 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-bin/test.cgi
HTTP/1.0" 401 350
127.0.0.1 - kim [20/Mar/1998:12:37:39 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-
bin/test.cgi HTTP/l.O" 200247
127.0.0.1 [25/Mar/1998:05:50:35 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-bin/test.cgi
HTTP/1.0" 401 350
127.0.0.1 - kim [25/Mar/1998:05:50:45 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-
bin/test.cgi HTTP/l.O" 200 247
127.0.0.1 [25/Mar/1998:05:54:16 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-bin/test.cgi
HTTP/l.O" 401 350
127.0.0.1 - kim [25/Mar/1998:05:56:51 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-
bin/test.cgi HTTP/1.0" 200247
127.0.0.1 [25/Mar/1998:05:57:46 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-bin/test.cgi
HTTP/l.0" 401 350
127.0.0.1 - joe [25/Mar/1998:05:58:21 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-
bin/test.cgi HTTP/1.0" 401 350
127.0.0.1 [25/Mar/1998:06:35:09 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-bin/test.cgi
HTTP/I.O" 401 350
127.0.0.1 - kim [25/Mar/1998:06:37:20 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-
bin/test.cgi HTTP/l.0" 200 247
127.0.0.1 [25/Mar/1998:06:37:55 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-bin/test.cgi
HTTP/1.0" 401 350
127.0.0.1 - joe [25/Mar/1998:06:38:31 -0600J "GET /-choim/cgi-
bin/test.cgi HTTP/1.0" 401 350
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Absolute pathname points to file based on its absolute location on
the file system. [15]
Access control means that access to the resources within a
webspace is somehow restricted. [13]
(Access Configuration File) HTTPD Global access control is
defined by ACF. [13]
It a freeware Web server from Apache organization. [13]
It allows one to control access to resources so that remote users
must enter a valid user name and password to be able to use them.
[4,5,9,13]
COl stands for Common Gateway Interface, a method for running
programs on the Web server based on input from a Web browser.
[1]
They are a set of special variables that are in the environment
when a CGI program is requested. [1]
The model of interaction on a distributed system in which a
program at one site sends a request to a program at another site
and awaits a response. The requesting program is called a client;
the program satisfying the request is called the server. [21
Every process has it. This directory is where the search for all
relative pathnames start. [15]
(File Transfer Protocol) The standard, high-level protocol for
• transferring files over the Internet. [2]
It refers to an application program that interconnects two services.
[2]
Group Identification Number. [15]
A text-based information service used throughout the Internet. [2]
Any end-user computer system that connects to a network. Hosts
range in size from personal computers to supercomputers. [2]'
92
Host Name The host name is the system on the Internet where the infonnation
is stored, such as www.cs.okstate.edu. [2]
HTML (Hypertext Markup Language) The language used to develop web
documents. [10]
HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) Web servers and browsers
commWlicates using this protocol. [13]
IP Internet Protocol is the standard commWlication protocol of the
Internet. [2]
IP Address A 32-bit address assigned to each host that participates in the
Internet. [2]
NCSA The National Center for Supercomputing Applications.
Nobody This special user name can be used by network servers that allow
remote users to log in to a system, but with a UID and Gill that
provide no privileges. [15]
Port The abstraction that TCP/IP transport protocols use to distinguish
among multiple destinations within a given host computer. [2]
Query String The arguments to the CGI program or the form input (i f submitted
using GET). It contains everything after the question mark in the
URL. [1]
Relative Pathnames Relative Patlmames points to files based on their locations
relative to the current working directory. [15]
RFC (Request For Comments) The name ofa series of notes that
contain surveys, measurements, ideas, techniques, and
observations, as well as proposed and accepted TCP/fP protocol
standards.
Root (superuser) The special user whose UTD is 0 is called either root or superuser.
If a user has superuser privileges, most file permission checks are
bypassed. [15]
SFW Secure & Flexible CGI Wrapper is a security CGI wrapper suite
which ensures more secure and flexible CGI transaction.







(Transmission Control ProtocolfIntemet Protocol) A standard
connection-oriented communication protocol for the Internet. [2]
The TCPIIP standard protocol for remote tenninal service.
TELNET allows a user at one site to interact with a remote system
at another site. [2]
User Identification Number. [15]
A Universal Resource Locator specifies address of a web
document. [11, 12]
World Wide Web is a global, interactive, dynamic, cross-
platform, distributed, graphical hypertext information system that
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